The Phish-Market Protocol

Securely Sharing Attack Data Between Competitors

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Outline


- Motivation
- Requirements & Challenges
- The Phish-Market Protocol

- Concepts, not math

• Implementation & performance


Motivation

- Phishing is a serious problem for banks
- Phishers set up fake websites:
 - pretend to be banks
 - link to fake websites in spam
 - scam users into entering passwords



Motivation

- Banks hire `take-down' companies to patrol internet for phishing sites
 - Aggregate multiple URL feeds
 - Read from public sources (e.g., APWG)
 - Proprietary sources (e.g., spam honey traps)
 - Considered competitive advantage
- Take-down companies compete for clients
- Moore and Clayton estimate \$330,000,000 cost of refusing to share data



– For these two companies alone!

The Proposal

- Create a market for phishing data
 - Compensate companies for sharing data
 - Must take competitive interests into account

Requirements & Challenges

- Buyer learns only URLs that phish client banks
- Seller cannot learn who the Buyer's clients are
- Buyer must pay for new each URL learned
- Buyer doesn't pay for URLs already known

In Practice: Generic solutions extremely inefficient

Sharing cannot introduce significant delays

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Protocol Ideas


- Idea: "pay" with encrypted "coins"
- Reveal only payment totals
 Can't tell which URLs were those "sold"
- Relaxations for efficiency:
 - Buyer learns "tags" (i.e. banks) of *all* Seller URLs
 - Buyer learns which URLs already known to Seller (but does not pay for them)

Transaction Overview

- 1. Seller offers URL to Buyer
 - Oblivious Transfer
- 2. Buyer sends encrypted payment
 - Homomorphic Commitment
- 3. Buyer "proves" payment is good
 - Zero-Knowledge Proof
- 4. Buyer "proves" he knew URL
 - Zero-Knowledge Proof
- Seller's view is always the same, regardless of whether the payment is real or fake!


The Phish-Market Protocol

• Meet Sally and Bob:



Commitment Schemes

- Commitment to a value:
 - Commit now
 - "Hiding": Sally doesn't learn contents



- Reveal later
 - "Binding": Bob can't change the contents
- Bob commits in advance to the URLs he knows

Zero-Knowledge Equivalence Proofs

- Prove two commitments are the same
- Don't reveal anything else



- To prove payment is good: "payment=C(1)"
- To prove Bob already knew URL

Zero-Knowledge Equivalence Proofs with trapdoor


- Sometimes Bob shouldn't pay
- Sometimes Bob didn't know URL beforehand



- Trapdoor lets Bob use secret key to fake proof
- Sally can't tell the difference

Oblivious Transfer (OT)

- Sally prepares two encrypted items
- Bob gets to choose only **one** encryption key






- Either learn URL or get extra "proof key"
- Sally doesn't learn which key Bob chooses
 - assume keys are indistinguishable

Homomorphic Addition

• Special commitment scheme:

Can add commitments without opening them



Homomorphic Addition

• Special commitment scheme:


Can add commitments without opening







- Can reveal sum without revealing anything else


High-Level Protocol Summary






High-Level Protocol Summary







Formal Security Guarantees


- For Seller:
 - Equivalent to an "ideal world" with a trusted third party.
- For Buyer:
 - Seller doesn't learn anything about Buyer's secrets except what is revealed by aggregate payment.
- Theorem: the protocol is secure!

Our Implementation

- Pedersen Commitment
- Naor-Pinkas Oblivious Transfer
 - (uses "Random Oracle")
- Both based on hardness of discrete log in a generic group
 - can be implemented over Elliptic-Curves or using modular arithmetic

Performance

- Elliptic-Curve based Java implementation
- Ran experiments using real data from 2 takedown companies (2 weeks)
 Ran experiments using real data from 2 take-
- ~10000 URLs
- Avg. 5 sec delay.
- Max. 35 sec.



The Qilin Crypto SDK


(shameless plug for my absent co-author)

- Java SDK for rapid prototyping of cryptographic protocols
- API follows concepts from theoretical crypto
- Currently implements all building-blocks of Phish-Market Protocol
 - Generic implementation of El-Gamal, Pedersen
 - Instantiations over elliptic curves and over \mathbf{Z}^*_{p}
 - Automatic Fiat-Shamir converter for Σ -Protocols
- Get Qilin: <u>http://qilin.seas.harvard.edu/</u>

Open Questions


- Solve related data-sharing problems?
 - Much easier if we don't need to handle previously known URLs
- Implement generic secure computation to prevent tag leaks
- Side-channels?
- Will any take-down companies or banks adopt our protocol?

Thank You



Proof 3: Merkle Trees

- Efficient commitment to large sets
 - Send only the root of the tree:



- Proofs are not zero-knowledge
 - We use commitments as leaves
 - Add "chaff" commitments for fake URLs

ZK Equivalence Proof (for homomorphic commitments)

- To prove: $C(x) \approx C(y)$
 - Reduce to "proof of committed value":
 - Prove: $C(x)/C(y)=C(x-y) \approx C(0)$
- Standard protocol to prove $C(x) \approx C(0)$:
 - 1. Prover commits: C(b), sends b
 - 2. Verifier sends random challenge: a
 - 3. Prover opens commitment: C(ax+b)=C(x)^aC(b)
 - Value must be: b
- If x≠0, w.h.p. (over a) we have: ax+b≠b
- If Prover knows a, can cheat by computing
 b'=ax+b in step 1.

Doesn't open commitment

> Note: arithmetic is modular!

Trapdoor ZK Proofs

- ZK \sum Protocol:
 - 1. Prover commits
 - 2. Verifier sends a random challenge
 - 3. Prover opens commitment
- Generic transformation to add trapdoor:
 - 1. Prover commits
 - 2. Challenge computed using Coin-Flipping protocol
 - 3. Prover opens commitment
- We use Coin-Flipping protocol with trapdoor.

Blum Coin-Flipping (with trapdoor)

- Use a commitment to flip a coin:
 - Bob chooses a random value
 - He's committed, but Sally doesn't know the value





- Sally chooses a random value
- Bob opens his commitment.
- The value of the coin is the sum.
- Bob can cheat if he can equivocate on commitment